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ABSTRACT: The pesticide controversy is much more complicated than simply a disagreement over facts and risk estimates
between the "experts" and the "fearful." It is a battle over ideology as much as one over information. This paper discusses
the notion of "educating the public" about pesticides, establishing realistic expectations of efforts by industry and academia,
and notes some of the limitations, and potential involvement, of scientists as "translators" in dealing with this controversy.
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I don't have to go through my list of recent news articles
about the pesticide controversy to tell you that there is intense
interest on the part of the state and federal legislatures, the
news media and some individuals on this issue. There is no
one in this room that is unaware of the controversy. But do
you really understand what's going on out there? Or do you,
like many, sit back and wring your hands wondering why
someone doesn't "do something!" about the bad rap pesticides get when you pick up your newspaper or turn on your
television? Who's out there "educating the public" to gain
their acceptance of pesticides as a necessary part of life?

But money alone is not the answer in persuading people
about risks. Ask the U.S. nuclear power industry which
spends $180 million a year on just its communications
programs.
More importantly, there is no PR firm or program that has
the power over the attitudes and beliefs of those 235 million
Americans to calm the big debate - the big debate being that
over technology and society, not just pesticides.
THE "EXPERTS" VS. THE "FEARFUL"
Why is it that I am pessimistic about a nationwide effort
to "educate the public"? Number one, I don't think the
majority of the ag, chemical or university people even
understand what the problem is with regard to the public's
perception of chemicals. And, number two, it is naive to
believe that a temporary information campaign will alter
attitudes and beliefs that have, for most people, developed
over a number of years from many sources of information,
much of which is not even directly related to the particular
issue of pesticides.
Let me be more specific about my two points, the first
being that we don't really understand the problem.
In general, "industry people," along with some academics and regulators, explain the controversy as a communications and education problem due to lack of knowledge about
technology and irrational fear on the part of the public and
workers. They compare the risks of using chemicals with the
much greater risk of driving cars, ignoring the fact that the
public feels "in control" when they drive, they feel it is a
voluntary activity, and they believe they derive some personal benefit from using a car.
Chemical users stand up in front of groups and declare,
"I've used pesticides for 25 years and I have five healthy
children and I've never missed a day of work," as if to say "If
I'm safe, so are you." The problem with that argument is that
it is scientifically invalid, and, most important, people just
don't believe it. (In a June 1987 public opinion survey
conducted for the California Alliance for Food and Fiber, 64
percent of the 500 respondents rejected that as a valid point.)

NO "WHITE KNIGHT" PR PROGRAMS
Overall, I think many people in the agricultural and
chemical industries want to hire a big PR firm to go out there
and "educate the public" ~ make them accept the use of
chemicals in agriculture and stop complaining about it. I've
been dealing with this controversy from a PR role since 1980,
and I think I can say with some assurance, that's not going to
happen. Why? A couple of reasons. First, because there is
no mechanism in place — organizationally or financially within the agricultural and chemical industries on the national level to conduct a serious program that would have
significant impact on 235 million Americans. Certainly there
are numerous lobbyists employed by the 63 national farm and
ag chemical-related trade associations located in Washington, D.C., not to mention lobbyists back there who represent
state and regional groups and companies, but those people
focus their efforts almost entirely on attempting to persuade
53 United States Senators and 125 U.S. Congressmen on six
committees which oversee legislation related to agricultural
and chemical issues. The National Agricultural Chemicals
Association, which focuses entirely on ag chem issues, has
just one person in charge of the entire public affairs efforts of
the industry. Its public affairs budget has been abysmally
low, with a good portion of its PR efforts aimed at telling
farmers and applicators how to avoid accidents, and, to their
credit, finally waking up to the groundwater contamination
issue.
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Nevertheless, what "industry and academics" are really
saying is that people don't realize how low most chemical
risks faced by the public are, and if they did, the people should
be willing to tolerate these low-level risks in exchange for
certain benefits. The expressed strategy: "educate the public
and they will realize how minimal the risks are."
Those opposed to certain technologies describe the risk
controversy in very different terms — that of business putting
profits before people, a governmental system that fails to
protect the people, and they refer to themselves as helpless
victims who are "guinea pigs" being subjected to a "time
bomb" of a dismal nature. They criticize industry and
academics for making the issues unnecessarily and overly
complex and too big to deal with, and they charge industry
with withholding information. They believe, "It's the polluters who should pay for mistakes, not the consumers nor the
government."
The strategy for those philosophically opposed to chemical use: Instill doubt in the minds of the average citizen or
legislator about the safety of using chemicals (or nuclear
power, biotechnology or irradiation, for that matter). Then,
convince the legislators and regulators - and the public - that
if risks must be borne by the public and/or workers, they
should be minimized to the fullest extent possible - not
necessary, but possible - regardless of cost. This is the basis
for California's Proposition 65 - The Safe Drinking Water
and Toxic Enforcement Act - the first part of which went into
effect February 27, 1988. Support is generated at the
grassroots level by convincing people that they, the people,
take the risks and it is the faceless, anonymous corporations
that reap the benefits. People have an innate sense of avoiding
risks unless they see some personal benefit. And they don't
see a personal benefit to the use of chemicals in agriculture,
and many of them don' t see the connection with public health
protection. This fact, too, was confirmed in our statewide
survey. We learned that while people may believe that the
major reasons for pesticide use are increased yields and the
need to "kill bugs," they do not take that next step and see any
personal benefits - namely lower food costs and greater
availability. Only two percent cited a primary use of pesticides as controlling diseases and germs.

I've had discussions with a representative of the Natural
Resources Defense Council in San Francisco with whom I
occasionally appear opposite in debates. Since she had been
involved in last year's negotiations between the environmental and the ag and chemical groups over the Federal
Insecticide, Fungicide and Rodenticide Act (FIFRA), I asked
her whether the disagreements centered mainly on factual or
ideological differences. The long arguments were over
ideology; the short ones were about information. Her
example was the liability issue for groundwater. The farmers
wanted to be exempted from liability if groundwater were to
become polluted from ag practices. The manufacturers
wanted out, saying "If applied according to label directions
...," and the NRDC felt that in an ideal world the manufac turers should be held liable as an incentive for safer products,
but that it was difficult to determine exactly how and why the
contamination occurred and whose fault it was. Each interest
group brought into play their values of how society should
operate and where responsibility lies when things don't go
according to plan.
What all of this means in terms of the chemical controversy is that individuals or groups committed to different
social/political ideologies (for instance, technical progress
and economic competition versus agrarian Utopia and preservation of a pristine environment) are headed for a clash.
THE FALLACY OF "EDUCATING THE PUBLIC"
I hinted earlier my feelings about the ineffectiveness of
a temporary information or PR campaign. This is based on
the established communications principle that peoples' values do not necessarily change with more information particularly when the information is conflicting or when it
contradicts what they already perceive to be true. As they say
in communications research, people tend to hear what they
believe, not the other way around. This is why communications efforts by "business advocates" and even scientists,
particularly industry scientists, and even government regulators, are sometimes greeted with skepticism, if not the charge
that "you're lying." The information the public hears from
these sources is not consistent with their internal beliefs about
the motivations, credibility and responsibility of industry and
regulators.
In addition, there is some evidence that knowing just a
little bit about something can make you more skeptical of the
issue or technology than complete ignorance. Therefore, it
is naive to believe that the solution to the chemical risk
controversy in this country is simply to "educate the public."
Again, the bottom line is that this controversy is as much over
ideology as it is over information. And ideology is a difficult
thing to alter with a public relations program. For instance,
if a person is firmly convinced that industry's greed, reflected in its use of use of chemicals which are unquestionably
"toxic," is responsible for a nationwide "cancer epidemic,"
there's not much you can alter that by telling him that coyotes
and rats really need to be killed or controlled.

THE ESSENCE OF THE CONTROVERSY: CONFLICTING SOCIAL VALUES
In short, the real arguments between environmentalists
and industry are not so much about facts or probabilities of
risk as they are objections to the social/political/economic
systems which generate the risks and with which the average
person feels few ties. It is a reflection of different attitudes
toward power, control, choice, infringement upon liberties
and industrial democracy. Thus, attitudes about technical
risks tend to be imbedded in conscious and unconscious
feelings about the source of the risk, along with the issue of
equity - who gets the benefits and who takes the risks - and
the issue of liability -- whose fault is contamination and who
should pay to clean it up?
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A REALISTIC ASSESSMENT OF INVOLVEMENT AND
IMPACT
Well, I've just given you my impressions of the underlying themes of the pesticide controversy along with my
reasons for believing that no white knight PR program is
going to calm the stormy seas of the pesticide controversy on
the national level. It even sounds like I've talked myself out
of a job as being the spokesperson for California agriculture
on the issue of pesticides and being so presumptuous as to say
I conduct a PR program on the issue. Should we all just pack
it up and concede defeat in the battle over public opinion?
Obviously, I did not set myself up to answer yes and offer my
resignation at this meeting.
There really is no choice but for each group involved in
this controversy to figure out its best case and be ready to put
it forward in a way that addresses the concerns of the public,
not just that particular group. Next, those groups need to
realistically assess what impact they can and can't have.
Don't think that any one program is going to reach 235
million Americans or even California's 26 million residents.
Most of those people don't have the time or the interest to
really study the issues as you whose careers depend on it do.
In my experience, most of the farmers, pest control
advisors, and chemical company people spend an inordinate
amount of time worrying about the perceptions of people in
the cities and an inadequate amount of time worrying about
what people in their own backyard think. Why do I say this?
Because, realistically, most of you will not have an impact on
the opinion leaders in our big cities, but you can and will
affect the perceptions of those you live and work with. And
if you're having problems in your own backyard, that's what
may eventually make it to the attention of a wider audience.
So, the first part of my speech tries to make the point that
it is not possible for a national PR program to get people to
accept the notion that a little bit of poison is okay. The second
part of my speech is to emphasize the importance of realizing
that public relations and education begins in one's own
backyard, not in a chat with Mike Wallace on "60 Minutes,"
and it is. something each of you can affect.
THE SILENT SCIENTISTS -- THE NEED FOR "TRANSLATORS"
Why is it that the most credible source of information on
the topic of chemicals, university scientists, are reluctant to
get involved in the controversy? Let me suggest a few
reasons:
1) It's not their job. University people talk to other
university people (called peers) and Extension people talk to
farmers and pest control advisors. Few people in the university system, with the exception of a few I could count on one
hand, see it as benefiting their careers to direct information
at the interested public or the media. And why should they
if they don't get "brownie points" for it? I, too, would spend
my time doing research to be published under those circum
stances.
2) Even if scientists did want to do something to foster
a better understanding of the realities of pest management,

few scientists really know enough about how to go about it,
who they should be talking to, or what makes a persuasive
argument. And, in my opinion, the scientists aren't getting
very creative help from their communications people on an
issue that everyone in the ag, the chemical, and the academic
worlds agrees is a major public perception problem. It's not
enough to get articles about progress in farming technology
published in trade publications; why not aim for material the
public and/or opinion leaders read - such as People magazine
and Reader's Digest.
3) Scientists often feel harassed, misquoted and misunderstood. They are and they will be. That's life. Journalists, politicians and environmentalists feel they're underpaid,
overworked and undervalued. They are and they will be.
That's life. But the journalists, politicians and environmenttalists are going to continue pursuing this chemical controversy; and if legitimate scientists don't take the interest in
speaking up for the realities of producing food, there are other
pseudo-scientists who will.
4) And lastly, some of the scientists, particularly those
who are more experienced in these issues than I, wonder
whether it really makes a difference to get involved. Some
times I ask my self that, too. And I can't really answer. I have
no statistics like the lobbyists do - x number of bills passed
and y number of bills killed. I can deal with that ambiguity
and uncertainty, but I accept that many people would find that
too intangible and frustrating.
SUGGESTIONS FOR CONSIDERATION
1) If the Land Grant universities are going to direct
much of their resources toward research on chemical pest
control, it seems reasonable that they might want to be more
public in supporting and defending their findings. And, if the
research unveils damaging information, that too should be
known.
2) Undertake some economic analyses of pesticide
use. I've scoured the literature to find out such information
and the best that I can come up with is information gathered
by Dr. David Pimintel of Cornell in the mid-1970s. The
public, and I, would like to know what differences in yields
and public health protection pesticides make? Why do we
really have to kill fuzzy little animals?
3) Encourage Cooperative Extension to explore possibilities for bringing different factions together in communities where pesticides and vertebrate pest control seem to be
an issue. Usually, community people want to be listened to
and they want the farming/chemical industries to make some
compromises. Before the issue starts drawing statewide
attention, perhaps the University could act to bring the groups
together and open up lines of communication.
4) Produce, encourage and reward "translators" —
those scientists and non-scientists who can take complex
scientific information and make it meaningful to the public.
We need committed, sensitive and intelligent people with the
support of their professions, their institutions, and their
companies to put together the best case for the role of
chemicals in controlling pests, acknowledging its weak7

nesses and shortcomings, and then put themselves on the line
by taking that message to the media, to opinion leaders, to
regulators and to legislators. The purpose is not to persuade
people to like pesticides, but to persuade them to consider

many aspects of the issue before they make their decisions.
That's when public perception of chemical risks, and ultimately public policy, will begin to swing back to the center.
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